


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CUBA - LATIN AMERICA: [redacted] Havana is  
modifying its policies in Latin America.

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Since 1968, Cuba has sharply reduced its support to Latin American revolutionary groups while gradually expanding its government-to-government contacts.

[redacted]  
Cuba's subversive efforts in Latin America have not been successful and [redacted] Havana has failed to "formulate a new Marxist approach in the hemisphere." [redacted] two other factors which have also contributed to the shift in Cuban policy--the high cost of subversive activities and Soviet pressure to end them.

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Cuba's increasing respectability in the hemisphere became even more apparent last month with the results of Peru's initiatives in the Organization of American States (OAS). Although Lima's resolution failed, seven nations voted in favor of it. Peru later established diplomatic relations with Cuba. Havana now has full relations with Mexico, Chile, and Peru and consular relations with Jamaica.

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[redacted] Prime Minister Manley of Jamaica is also moving in this direction. A number of Latin American governments, however, are still strongly opposed to Castro. Brazil, Paraguay, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and several Central American states publicly and privately oppose any reconciliation with the Castro government.

Castro is convinced that the present political trend in the hemisphere is in his favor, and he is apparently working hard to capitalize on it. To [redacted]

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[this end, the Castro government probably will continue to push for more exchanges of athletic teams, cultural groups, and scientific and technical delegations. These could be followed by Cuban trade offers that could serve as a basis for continued expansion of ties.

Despite an emphasis on such actions, however, Cuba continues to provide limited support--primarily insurgency training in Cuba--for some revolutionary groups. [redacted]

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